Ownership, Control, and Incentive by Wang, Tianxi
ISSN 1755-5361 
                                University of Essex 
 
 
 
       Department of Economics 
 
 
 
  
      
        
 
 Discussion Paper Series 
 
    
   No. 676 November 2009 
    
 
Ownership, Control, and Incentive 
 
Tianxi Wang 
 
Note : The Discussion Papers in this series are prepared by members of the Department of 
Economics, University of Essex, for private circulation to interested readers. They often 
represent preliminary reports on work in progress and should therefore be neither quoted nor 
referred to in published work without the written consent of the author. 
Ownership, Control, and Incentive
Tianxi Wang
Abstract
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1 Introduction
Ronald Coase (1937) initiated the inquiry into the nature of the rm. He believed, and so
did Simon (1951), Williamson (1975) among many others, that the rm, as is di¤erent from
the market, is dened by authority. This belief was criticized as "delusion" by Alchian and
Demsetz (1974), who asserted that the rm has no authority any di¤erent from ordinary market
contracting and that "(the employer) can re or sue, just as I can re my grocer by stopping
purchases from him or sue him for delivering faulty products." This paper tries to reconcile the
two sides, by showing that the principal can enhance her control over the agents human capital
by acquiring the physical capital critical for him to create value. The literature on the theory of
the rm overwhelmingly concentrates on incentives, but touches control (or coordination) only
lightly, as Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) have noted. While the literature on the allocation of
decision rights is related to control, it presumes that decision rights can be moved freely, namely
the control over the agents human capital is always successful when it is indispensable. This
paper is one of few that address how inter-personal relationships change across the boundary of
the rm.
The paper explicitly di¤erentiates control problems from incentive problems. Both refer
to situations where the principal wants the agent to make a preferable choice among ex ante
uncontractible actions. Control problems di¤er from incentive problems in ex post contractibility
of the choice. If on the time when the choice is being decided, it is contractible and hence
negotiated between the two parties, it is a control problem, and if not, an incentive problem.
For example, it is a control problem to ensure G. W. Bush to or not to invade Iraq, but it is an
incentive problem to ensure him to spend more time considering serious stu¤ rather than having
fun, as he claimed that he was working even in his Texas farm.
Control is modelled in this paper as the choice between two projects, to be done with a
capital: the general project that supplies the market, or the specic project that supplies the
principal solely. To accomplish either project relies on the agents human capital. Therefore,
the principal, no matter if acquiring the capital, has to bargain with him on the project choice.
They have equal bargaining power, that is, each has one half chance to make a take-it-or-leave-it
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o¤er (tioli) to the other. On the other hand, the capital is critical for the agent to create any
value. The value of either project depends on the agents human capital investment ex ante and
his e¤ort ex post. Both are chosen privately by him, not subject to bargaining; the choices are
thus of incentive problems.
The last ingredient of the model is the friction of bargaining, without which Coasian bar-
gaining always pick the ex post e¢ cient project, whoever owns the capital. In the paper, the
friction is information asymmetry. Roughly, at the date of negotiating the project choice, the
agent knows the value of the general project, while the principal knows only its distribution.
In this set-up, in order to incentivize the agent, he should always have the payo¤ rights of
the capital, that is, own the projects product, since the value of the product is not contractible,
as in Grossman and Hart (1986). Moreover, control entails incentive loss. Control means to
do the specic project, which captures win-lose coordination leading the agent into a hold-up
situation. Indeed, if doing the specic project, he only reaps half of its value, since the principal
is the only buyer of his product. On the contrary, he obtains the full value of the general project.
Therefore, there is a trade-o¤ between control and incentive.
The allocation of ownership of the capital a¤ects the default project, namely the project that
is chosen when there is no bargaining or bargaining reaches no agreement. The default choice
a¤ects the equilibrium choice when the principal o¤ers tioli (while when the agent o¤ers tioli,
the project choice follows ex post e¢ ciency since the principal has no private information).
Consider rst the case of principal-ownership. The default choice is the specic project:
it is not the general project, since the principal, now the owner of the capital, gets nothing
immediately from the project; it is not null project either: leaving the principal and thus the
capital, the agent can do nothing and gets nothing. Therefore, if the agent wants to do the
general project, he has to buy the principals assent with side payment. On the default option,
she obtains half of the specic projects value. When she o¤ers tioli, therefore, she asks for a
price beyond the half value by a positive di¤erence. The agent accepts the asked price, in order
to do the general project, only if its value is no less than the sum of the price plus his value from
the default option, half of the specic projects value. Therefore, the general project is chosen
only if its value is beyond the specics plus the positive di¤erence. It follows that when the
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general project is worth more than the specic but less than the latter plus the di¤erence, it is
socially e¢ cient but not chosen. That is, principal-ownership induces too much control.
Consider then the case of agent-ownership. Now the default choice is the general project
since he gets nothing immediately from the specic project. If the principal wants him to work
for her, to do the specic project, she has to buy his assent with side payment. On his assent, she
gets half of the specic projects value. When she o¤ers tioli, therefore, she o¤ers a price below
the half value by a positive di¤erence. If accepting the o¤er, the agent obtains the price plus half
of the specic projects value. The o¤er is accepted, so the specic project is chosen, therefore,
only if the general project is worth less than the specic project minus the di¤erence. It follows
that when the general project is worth more than that but less than the specic project, it is
socially ine¢ cient but is chosen, that is, there is too little control.
Centralized ownership under the principal, therefore, implements more win-loss coordination,
and also induces more incentive losses, than decentralized ownership. This is consistent with
Chandler (1977)s documentation that vast amounts of assets were put under centralized own-
ership, which generated giant US corporations, only when transactions were better coordinated
by direction of mangers within the rm than by the market. Moreover, note that principal-
ownership in this paper captures the M-form rm, of which the agent is a division: ownership
of physical capital is centralized under the principal, but the agent keeps the payo¤ rights of
his division. This paper therefore presents a new rationale for the M-form rm: centralized
ownership of physical capital to facilitate win-loss coordination and dispersed payo¤ rights to
incentivize divisions.1
The paper is related to the literature on the theory of the rm, to the literature on the
allocation of decision rights, and most closely, to several recent papers on authority and the
boundary of the rm.
The literature on the theory of the rm touches the control side only lightly. A good survey
is provided by Gibbons (2004), who classies the literature into four categories which are to be
examined in order. The property rights theory (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore
1For other research on M-form and U-form rms, see Maskin et al (2000) and Qian et al (2006).
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(1990) and Hart (1995); GHM hereinafter) is concerned with suboptimal provision of ex ante
(human capital) investment. The level of the investment is not decided by bargaining when it
is being laid down, though observable afterwards; otherwise, the hold-up problems evaporate.
The incentive theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994), and Holmstrom (1999) etc.) is
concerned with the balance of the incentive of exerting e¤ort between multiple tasks or between
multiple agents. Similarly, the quasi-rent seeking theory (Baker and Hubbard (2000) etc.) is
concerned with how the allocation of ownership of physical capital a¤ects the incentive balance
between rent seeking and doing the assignment for the principal. In either category, the level
or the distribution of the e¤ort is decided by the agent privately, not even observable to the
principal, and is thus of incentive problems. Therefore, the above three categories of literature
address the incentive side only, not the control side (as is dened in this paper). The fourth and
the last category, relational adaptation theory (Simon (1951) and Williamson (1975, 1991) etc.),
pays attention to control. The comparison to it is detailed below.
The literature on the allocation of decision rights is also voluminous, tracing back to Simon
(1951) and recently including Athey and Roberts (2001), Aghion et al (2004), Bolton and Dewa-
tripont (2005), Dessein et al (2007), Friebel and Raith (2007), Alonso et al (2008), Baker et al
(2008), and Rantakari (2008).2 This literature assumes away ex post bargaining and presumes
that decision rights are freely moveable. In most cases, however, the action under decision has
to be carried out by the agent even if he has no formal decision rights, like the case of this
paper where the capital has to be operated with by the agent. For these cases, the literature
presumes that control over his human capital is always successful, while this paper advances one
step further and examines this presumption.
The paper is most closely related to Hart and Holmstrom (2009) and Van den Steen ( 2009).
Similar to this paper, Hart and Holmstrom (2009) derives that integration induces too much
2Among them, Athey and Roberts (2001), Dessein et al (2007), and Friebel and Raith (2007) derive a trade-
o¤ between coordination and incentive, from the tension that to encourage coordination, the agent should be
rewarded based on overall performance measure, but to elicit e¤ort, narrowly on e¤ort-related performance
measure. In contrast, the trade-o¤arises in this paper because of the hold-up problem which win-loss coordination
entails. Williamson (1975, 1991) also informally expounds a similar trade-o¤, between adaptation and incentive.
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coordination and non-integration too little. This paper di¤ers from theirs in two aspects. Their
paper, as the literature on decision rights, assumes away ex post bargaining and presumes suc-
cessful control. And the cost side of integration in their paper is the (assumed) reduction in the
private benets caused by coordination, while that in this paper is incentive losses. Van den
Steen (2009) considers, similarly, how centralized ownership of physical assets and low-powered
incentives give the principal authority over the agent.3 His paper is driven by the assumption
that the two have di¤ering priors, while this paper makes no such an assumption and adopts
a conventional approach.4 Moreover, this paper is richer than his paper, in the sense that au-
thority in the manner of his paper is a feasible but dominated arrangement in this paper: when
the principal gets the payo¤ rights of the capital and the agent is paid thus with a xed wage,
he is willing to do whatever project dictated by the principal; this arrangement, however, is
dominated since it induces too much incentive loss (see Subsection 3.3 below).5 This papers
point of view is that as employees of critical human capital are concerned, the boss may never
have dictating authority over them in the manner of Van den Steen (2009) and what is described
in this paper is more likely to happen.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes
all the possible contractual arrangements (called regimes) one by one. Then they are compared
in Section 4 to nd the equilibrium arrangement. Section 5 presents empirical evidences and
lastly, Section 6 concludes.
3And Van den Steen (2006) derives, in a di¤erent set-up, a trade-o¤ between coordination and incentive, which
is also driven by di¤ering priors.
4The assumption gives rise to the concern on how to decide ex ante e¢ ciency and hence the equilibrium
arrangement. With the assumption, maximizing the sum of the two partiesexpected utilities is not satisfactory,
because at least one partys assigned probability is wrong; moreover, the sum can be made arbitrarily large by
having the two parties bet on the state.
5This argument shows that low-powered incentives alone su¢ ce to ensure authority.
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2 The Model
The model consists of a principal (denoted by P), an agent (A) and a capital.6 Both players
are risk neutral. The capital is indispensable for A to create value, and on the other hand, As
human capital is indispensable for it to be utilized. With the capital, A could engage into two
exclusive projects. One aims to coordinate with Ps integrated strategy and leads to a specic
product useful to none but P. The other project aims to supply the market and leads to a product
of general interest. The specic project captures win-lose coordination and is denoted by "s",
and the general project is denoted by "g".
The value of either product depends on the human capital investment A makes before the
project is chosen and the e¤ort level he exerts in doing the chosen project. Either the investment
or the e¤ort su¢ ces to capture the incentive side. Nevertheless, both are introduced, the e¤ort
introduced to show that the theory of the paper does not rely on investment specicity and the
investment introduced to show that the theory is rich enough to cover ex ante incentives.
Timing:
There are ve dates. At date 0, P and A decide the allocation of ownership and payo¤ right
of the capital. Here ownership means, following GHM, residual control rights, namely that the
owner can always walk away from bargaining with the capital and put it in an alternative usage,
if she or he wishes. And payo¤ rights here mean the ownership of the projects product. At
date 1, A makes the human capital investment. At date 2, the state is realized, and P and A
negotiate the project to be done. At date 3, A chooses the level of the e¤ort to do the chosen
project. At date 4, the product of the project is yielded, and is traded if P has no payo¤ rights.
An arrangement of the ownership and payo¤ rights of the capital is called a "regime". The
timing is illustrated in gure 1 below.
6Implicitly, P has owned some other capital. The assumption, then, is that this capital is of such a vast
size that A can never take over P. Therefore, unlike Grossman and Hart (19086), this paper only examines one
direction of integration, namely P acquiring A, and the model captures the situations between a large company
(P) and a small team (A), not that between two equals.
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Regime Investment State & project Product
0 1 2 43
effort
Figure 1: Timing Tree
The values of the two products are as follows. If A invests i 2 [0;1) at date 1 and exerts e¤ort
e 2 [0;1) at date 3, and the realized state is t, then the value of the specic product is vs(i; e)
and the market price of the general product is vg(i; e; t) = tvs(i; e): Assume t 2 [0; 1]; that is,
given the investment and e¤ort levels, the specic project is always worth more than the general
project; the excess is the benet of coordination. To capture this benet, let vs(i; e) = d(i; e)+B;
where d(i; 0) = d(0; e) = 0 and B  0; thus B has no incentive e¤ect upon i or e and captures
only the benet of coordination. Denote by ci(i) the cost of investing i and by ce(e) the disutility
of exerting e¤ort e. Assume that the value functions are strictly increasing and concave and that
the cost functions are strictly increasing and convex.
Information:
The project choice is not contractible before date 2 and is contractible and negotiated between
P and A at the date. It is thus of a control problem. We call it loss of control(for P) if the
specic project is not chosen at date 2. The investment level, i, is not contractible and decided
privately by A at date 1, but observable at date 2, as in GHM. The e¤ort level, e; is never
observable to P, as in a typical moral hazard problem. The choices of i and e are thus of
incentive problems. The value of the product is never contractible but observable at date 4, as
in GHM. This bears two implications: one, no contract is feasible to incentivize A except giving
him the payo¤ rights; and the other, even when A obtains the payo¤ rights, he will be held up
by P if doing the specic project, since she is then the only buyer of his product.
Assume state et uniformly distributes on [0; 1] before date 2. At date 2, only A knows privately
its realized value, t; while P still knows only its distribution. Information asymmetry is to capture
bargaining costs.
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Assumption (Incomplete Contracting): at date 0, P and A do nothing but decide the al-
location of the ownership and payo¤ rights of the capital.
To be sure, P and A could learn a lot from the implementation theory to design some
mechanisms on how to choose the project at date 2 and on how to trade the product at date
4, which is, however, assumed away. See Hart (1995) and Hart and Moore (1999) for some
justications for this assumption.
By the assumption, the project choice is decided via bargaining between P and A at date 2,
and if A has the payo¤ rights, the price of the specic product is decided via bargaining at date
4. Assume that P and A have equal bargaining power, that is, each party has 1
2
chance to make
a take-it-or-leave-it (tioli) o¤er to the other.
At date 0, P and A choose one out of the four following alternative regimes. The equilibrium
regime will be the one that maximizes the total surplus of P and A, as side payment of any
amount is feasible.
Regime 1: A has the ownership and the payo¤ rights of the capital.
Regime 2: P owns the capital and A has the payo¤ rights.
Regime 3: A owns the capital and P has the payo¤ rights.
Regime 4: P has the both.
Under regime 1, A is an independent contractor. Under regime 2, he is a division of the
M-form rm, in the sense that ownership of non-human capital (this and Ps other capital) is
centralized in the hands of P, but A has an independent account and owns what he produces.
Regime 3 is an exclusive dealing arrangement, as A can only supply P. Under regime 4, A is a
salaried employee of P. It will be shown that regimes 3 and 4 are dominated by regime 1 or 2.
Thus what matters is the allocation of ownership of the capital. To justify regimes 3 and 4 we
could introduce the value of the capital in a manner of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), which
is not pursued here.
The next section nds out the outcome under each of the four regimes with backward induc-
tion.
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3 The Four Regimes
3.1 Regime 1: Independent Contractor
Under regime 1, A is an independent contractor of P and has both the payo¤rights and ownership
of the capital.
At date 4, A owns the product of the chosen project. If it is the general product, then he
sells it at price vg. If it is the specic product, he bargains with P on its price, which will be
half of its value, 1
2
vs; as they have equal bargaining power.
At date 3, the e¤ort level is chosen to maximize vg(i; e; t) ce(e) if the general project is chosen,
or to maximize 1
2
vs(i; e) ce(e) if the specic project is chosen. Note that vg(i; e; t) = tvs(i; e); so
the two problems can be unied. Let e(i; t)  maxe tvs(i; e)  ce(e) and V (i; t) be the maximum
value. , namely, V (i; t) = tvs(i; e(i; t)) c of the problem ; and e(i; t) be the maximizer, Suppress
argument i when we are discussing what happens after date 1. Then, A chooses e¤ort level of e(t)
for the general project and that of e(0:5) for the specic project, and V (t) = tvs(e(t))  ce(e(t)):
At the end of date 2, the social value of the general project is V (t) and that of the specic
project is vs(e(0:5))  ce(e(0:5)) = V (12) + 12bv; where bv  vs(e(0:5)): Dene bt as follows.
V (
1
2
) +
1
2
bv = V (bt) (1)
Then bt > 1
2
; and when t > bt; the general project is e¢ cient, because the specic project induces
incentive loss (e(t) > e(0:5)); the specic project is e¢ cient when t < bt; namely when the
incentive loss is not big.
At date 2, P and A negotiate the project to be done, as follows. Since A owns the capital
and the nal product under the regime, he can go directly for the general project, if he wishes.
Or he chooses to bargain with P on the price which she pays for him to do the specic project. If
he chooses so, the nature decides who has the chance to make a take-it-or-leave-it (tioli) o¤er to
the other. With probability 0.5, A o¤ers tioli to P; if she takes it, the specic project is chosen;
if she leaves it, A comes back to the general project. With probability 0.5, P o¤ers tioli to A;
if A takes it, the specic project is chosen; if A leaves it, he comes back to the general project.
Thus events tree is the following:
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ADo g directly
Bargain over s
A offers tioli
P offers tioli
0.5
0.5
P accepts s
P refuses g
A accepts s
A refuses g
Figure 2: the events tree of bargaining on the project choice under regime 1
"g" represents the general project and "s" the specic
Notice that in the bargaining game, at stage 1 strategy "do g directly" is weakly dominated
to A by "bargain over s" for any realized state t, because choosing to bargain, he can still pick
"g" with certainty, if he wishes, simply by rejecting Ps o¤er or tendering P with an unacceptable
o¤er. Thus, at stage 1, A always chooses to bargain and this choice signals nothing of As private
information. Denote by F the price P pays to A. From the specic project, P obtains half of
the specic products value, bv  vs(e(0:5)). Therefore, she will reject any asked price F > 12bv:
A will ask 1
2
bv exactly when he o¤ers tioli and wants it to be accepted, which then gives him
V (1
2
) + 1
2
bv: He obtains V (t) if the tioli is rejected and he goes for the general project. In case of
A o¤ering tioli, therefore, his payo¤ is maxfV (1
2
) + 1
2
bv; V (t)g; and the project choice is e¢ cient:
the specic project is chosen if and only if t  bt; which is because P has no private information.
Consider the case when P o¤ers tioli, F: In state t, A gets V (t) from rejecting the o¤er,
and V (1
2
) + F from accepting it. It is accepted, therefore, if and only if V (1
2
) + F  V (t): The
following happens.
Lemma 1 P will o¤er F = 0 and A accepts it if and only if t  0:5:
Proof. When having the chance to o¤er tioli, P faces a monopolists pricing problem: maxF Pr(etjV (12)+
F  V (et))(1
2
bv   F ): By the variable transformation F = V (t)   V (1
2
); the problem becomes
maxt Pr(et  t)(12bv + V (12)   V (t)) = maxt t(12bv + V (12)   V (t)); given t is distributed uni-
formly. Apply the envelop theorem, V 0(t) = vs(e(t)); the rst order condition of the problem
is 1
2
bv + V (1
2
)   V (t)   tvs(e(t)) = 0: It is easy to see that t = 12 is a solution as bv = vs(e(0:5)):
And it is the unique solution, since V (t) + tvs(e(t)) is an increasing function of t as e(t) is
increasing.
11
The two cases are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under regime 1, the specic project is certainly chosen if t  0:5, it is chosen with
probability 1
2
if 0:5 < t  bt; and it is not chosen if bt < t. Therefore, with probability 1  bt+ bt 0:5
2
there is loss of control.
Note that when 0:5 < t  bt; the specic project is not chosen when P o¤er tioli, even though
it is the e¢ cient one. Thus,
Corollary 1 Regime 1 induces too little coordination: the specic project is chosen only if it is
e¢ cient, and with probability bt 0:5
2
; it is not chosen even if it is e¢ cient.
After guring out what happens at date 2, we go backward to date 1 and date 0. We can
gure out the expected utility of A after investing i; denoted by U1(i); and the expected social
surplus, denoted by W 1(i): Then, at date 1, A invests i1 = argmaxi U1(i)  ci(i): At date 0, the
expected social surplus under regime 1 is W 1 = W 1(i1):
3.2 Regime 2: the M-form Firm
Under this regime, A is a division of the M-form rm: ownership of physical capital is centralized
in the hands of P, but A keeps an independent account and owns the nal product.
At date 4, A owns the product of the chosen project, as under regime 1. So he gets vg from
the general project and 1
2
vs from the specic project. And at date 3, the e¤ort level is e(t) for
the former and e(0:5) for the latter, all the same as under regime 1.
At date 2, the di¤erence from regime 1 presents itself. Under regime 1, the default project
is the general project, that is, A goes for the general project when he chooses not to bargain
with P or bargaining fails to reach any agreement, because he owns the capital under regime 1
and gets nothing immediately from the specic project before any side payment made by P to
him. Under regime 2, in contrast, P owns the capital and gets nothing immediately from the
general project, which, therefore cannot be the default project. The default project cannot be
null project either: the capital is critical for A to create value, so without it, A gains nothing,
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and hence As threat to leave P and thus the capital is not credible. The default project under
regime 2, therefore, must be the specic project. The change of ownership of the capital alters
the default project.
Under regime 2, if A wants to do the general project, he has to bargain with P on the price
for her approval. The bargaining process is similar to that of regime 1, di¤ering only in the
default project. At stage 1, A chooses either to do the specic project directly or to bargain
over the price to buy Ps approval of the general project. If he chooses the latter, then with
probability 0.5, A o¤ers P a tioli; if she takes it, the general project is chosen; if she leaves it, A
comes back to the specic project. And with probability 0.5, P o¤ers A a tioli price; if he takes
it, the general project is chosen; if leaving it, he comes back to the specic project. The events
tree is the following:
A
Do s directly
Bargain over g
A offers tioli
P offers tioli
0.5
0.5
P accepts g
P refuses s
A accepts g
A refuses s
Figure 3: the events tree of bargaining on the project choice under regime 2
"s" represents the specic project and "g" the general
Similarly, strategy "do s directly" is weakly dominated to A in any realized state at stage 1,
and hence A always chooses to bargain and this signals nothing of his private information. P
gets 1
2
bv from the default project, namely the specic project, and she gets nothing immediately
from the general project. To buy her approval for it, A has to pay F  1
2
bv: He will actually
pay F = 1
2
bv; if he o¤ers tioli, by which he gets V (t)   1
2
bv; while he gets V (1
2
) from the specic
project. Therefore, when A o¤ers tioli, he gets maxfV (1
2
); V (t)   1
2
bvg; exactly 1
2
bv less than
maxfV (1
2
) + 1
2
bv; V (t)g (what he get under regime 1), and the project choice follows ex post
e¢ ciency. That is, when A o¤ers tioli, ownership of the capital is only equivalent to a transfer
of 1
2
bv; and bears no e¤ect on the project choice, because P has no private information. What
happens when P o¤ers tioli is summarized in the lemma below.
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Lemma 3 P asks price bF  1
2
bv; and the strict inequality holds when the ex post incentive
matters, that is, e(t) strictly increases with t.
Proof. By the argument above, A accepts the asked price F if and only if V (t)   F  V (1
2
):
If he accepts it, P gets F ; otherwise she gets 1
2
bv: Her problem is thus to choose F to maximize
Q(F )  Pr(F )F +(1 Pr(F )1
2
bv = Pr(F )(F   1
2
bv)+ 1
2
bv; where Pr(F )  Prfetj(V (et) F  V (1
2
)g
denotes the probability of A accepting F . First, the optimal price bF  1
2
bv; since Q(1
2
bv) = 1
2
bv;
and Q(F ) < 1
2
bv for any F < 1
2
bv: Intuitively, P gets already 1
2
bv from the default option and it is
strictly dominated for him to ask for less.
Second, when e(t) strictly increases with t; V (1) = vs(e(1)) ce(e(1)) > vs(e(12)) ce(e(12)) =
1
2
bv+V (1
2
); where the rst strict inequality applies the fact that e(1) is the solution ofmaxe vs(e) 
ce(e) but e(12)(< e(1)) is not. Then, for some su¢ ciently small " > 0; Pr(
1
2
bv + ") > 0 and hence
Q(1
2
bv + ") > 1
2
bv: Therefore, bF > 1
2
bv:
Dene bT as follows.
V (
1
2
) + bF = V (bT ) (2)
Then, by the lemma and (1), bT  bt and bT > bt when the ex post incentive matters. A takes Ps
tioli if and only if t  bT : Then the two cases can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 4 Under regime 2, the specic project is certainly chosen if t < bt, it is chosen with
probability 1
2
if bt  t  bT ; and it is not chosen if bT < t. Therefore, with probability 1  bT + bT bt
2
there is loss of control.
Note that if bt < t the general project is socially e¢ cient. However, under regime 2, ifbt  t  bT ; it is chosen only with probability 1
2
: Therefore,
Corollary 2 Regime 2 induces too much coordination: the specic project is chosen whenever
it is e¢ cient, and with probability bT bt
2
; it is chosen even if it is not e¢ cient.
As under regime 1, we go backward to date 1 and date 0. We can gure out the expected
utility of A after investing i under the regime, denoted by U2(i); and the expected social surplus,
denoted by W 2(i): Then at date 1, A invests i2 = argmaxi U2(i)   ci(i): And at date 0, the
expected social surplus under regime 2 is W 2 = W 2(i2):
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3.3 Regimes 3 and 4: Authority
Under both regimes, at date 4 since P has the payo¤ rights, A just delivers whatever he has
produced to P. Thus A gets 0 at the date, whatever his e¤ort level and the project are. Thus he
chooses the lowest level of e¤ort, that is, e = 0 at date 3.
At date 2, since As continuation value is always 0, whatever the project to be done is, he is
indi¤erent with the project choice and just follows the choice dictated by P, who has thus inter-
personal authority over the agent, in the manner of Van den Steen (2009). Then the specic
project is chosen certainly. And at date 2, the social surplus is vs(0)   ce(0); which is strictly
smaller than vs(e(0:5))   ce(e(0:5)); the minimum social surplus under the regime 1 or 2 (the
surplus for t  0:5), when the ex post incentive matters.7 Therefore, under both regimes 3 and
4, there is no loss of control, but there is a severe loss of ex post incentive, which makes regimes
3 and 4 dominated by regime 1 or 2 in ex post e¢ ciency.
At date 1, regimes 3 and 4 also induces severe ex ante incentive loss, due to the specic
assumption that the two incentive variables are complement. Remember vs(i; e) = d(i; e) + B.
B has no incentive e¤ect and d(i; 0) = 0 for any i. Since A is going to choose e = 0 at date 3,
he chooses i = 0 at date 1. Then the two regimes are dominated by regime 1 or 2 in ex ante
e¢ ciency also. Summarily we have
Lemma 5 Under regimes 3 and 4, there is no loss of control but a severe loss of both ex ante
and ex post incentive (i = e = 0). The two regimes are thus dominated by regime 1 or 2.
We move on to compare the four regimes to nd the equilibrium one. By this lemma, the race
is between regimes 1 and 2. Following Grossman and Hart (1986), regime 2 is called integration
and regime 1 non-integration.
7 [vs(e(t))  ce(e(t))]0 = (v0s   c0e)e0(t) = (1  t)v0se0(t) > 0; when e0(t) > 0; where the last equation applies the
rst order condition for e(t): tv0s(e) = c
0
e(e):
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4 The Equilibrium Regime: Control versus Incentive
In this model, control entails incentive loss. Control means to do the specic project, namely,
to implement the coordination, the win-lose nature of which implies that A is to be held up by
P. Indeed, if doing the specic project, A only reaps half of its value, since P is the only buyer
of its product. On the contrary, he reaps the full value if doing the general project. Therefore,
A is less incentivized when doing the specic project than when doing the general one.
There are two dimensions of incentive, i and e, which are to be separated: when one is being
considered, the level of the other is xed. First consider the case of the ex post e¤ort and thus
x the choice of ex ante investment.
4.1 Control versus Ex Post Incentive (e)
In this subsection, suppose i = i (by assuming c0i = 1 for i > i; is reasonably small but still
positive for i < i). As before, for simplicity, argument i is suppressed in this subsection. And
assume ex post incentive matters, that is, e(t) is strictly increasing. Then bt < bT :
At date 2, the second best choice is to pick the specic project if t  bt and the general
project if t > bt: However, di¤erent from the second best case, the specic project is chosen only
with probability 0:5 if 0:5 < t < bt under regime 1 (by Lemma 2), and it is still chosen with the
probability 0.5 if bt < t < bT under regime 2 (by Lemma 4). All these three cases are contrasted
in gure 3, which pictures the probability of the specic project being chosen as a function of t
in the three cases.
0.5
1
0.5 tˆ Tˆ 1
2nd Best:
Integration:
Non-integration:
Prob. of s
State t
0
0
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Figure 4: the comparison between the second best and regime 1 and regime 2
The vertical axis is the probability of the specic project being chosen; the horizontal axis is state t.
According to the gure, the following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 1 Fix i = i: Integration brings about more control than non-integration, in the
sense of a higher probability with which the specic project is chosen, but integration induces loss
in the agents incentive of exerting e¤ort. Compared to the second best case, integration induces
too much coordination but non-integration induces too little.
The proposition hints that integration happens if and only if the benet of coordination is
larger enough. The benet is measured by B = vs(e)   d(e); which bears no incentive e¤ect.
Integration (regime 2) arises if and only if it generates a higher social surplus than non-integration
(regime 1), namely W 2 > W 1: The hint is strictly proved in the following.
Proposition 2 Fix i = i: If c000e  0 and d000  0; then d(W
2 W 1)
dB
>  for some  > 0: That is,
integration arises in equilibrium if and only if the benet of coordination (B) is larger than some
critical level.
Proof. The proof is put into the appendix. The di¢ culty is that bT changes with B.
We nish examining the trade-o¤ between control and ex post incentive. We move on to
examine the case of the ex ante incentive.
4.2 Control versus Ex Ante Incentive (i)
In this subsection, assume e(t) = e > 0 for t  0:5 (when t < 0:5 the specic project is chosen
under both regimes and e(t) = e(0:5)), so that ex post incentive does not matter, and for
simplicity, suppress argument e in this subsection, and without loss of generality let ce(e) = 0.
Thus, if A invests i at date 1, the social value of the specic project is vs(i)  d(i) +B.
Without the ex post incentive problem, V (i; t) = tvs(i) for all t; and by (1), bt = 1, namely
the specic project is always ex post e¢ cient. Then bT = 1, as bT  bt: That is, the specic project
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is always chosen under integration; intuitively, the specic project cannot be negotiated away
when it is the default choice, since its e¢ ciency is common knowledge. However, it is not chosen
with a positive probability under non-integration where the general project is the default choice;
this is because of the same reason as that by which the monopolist under-supplies customers, or
more generally, because of the friction of bargaining, to overcome which the e¢ ciency gain must
be great enough in order to negotiate away the default project.
Under regime 1, the social surplus is W 1(i) = 15
16
vs(i), where the coe¢ cient 1516 comes as
follows. Under the regime, with probability 3
4
; the specic project is chosen, of which the social
surplus is 1vs; and with probability 14 (namely when t  0:5 and A o¤ers tioli), the general project
is chosen, of which the social surplus is t  vs; with the average of t being E(etj0:5  et  1) = 34 ;
therefore, the overall coe¢ cient is 3
4
1+ 1
4
 3
4
= 15
16
: Under regime 1, As payo¤ is U1(i) = 9
16
vs(i):
when the specic project is chosen, he reaps half of the value, namely 1
2
vs; and when the general
project is chosen, he obtains the full value, namely t  vs; with the average of 34vs (as calculated
above); therefore, his expected payo¤ is [3
4
 1
2
+ 1
4
 3
4
]  vs = 916vs: Under Regime 2, the social
surplus is W 2(i) = vs(i), as the specic project is certainly chosen, and accordingly As payo¤
is U2(i) = 1
2
vs(i). Therefore, the investment level under regime 1 is i1 = argmax 916vs(i)  ci(i)
and that under regime 2 is i2 = argmax 1
2
vs(i)   ci(i): Certainly, i1 > i2; as 916 > 12 ; namely
integration induces incentive loss.
B bears no incentive e¤ect and hence i1and i2 are independent of B: Then the di¤erence
in the ex ante social surplus between the two regimes is W 1   W 2 = W 1(i1)   W 2(i2) =
15
16
(d(i1) + B)  [d(i2) + B]: It follows that d(W 1 W 2)
dB
=   1
16
< 0: That is, W 2 > W 1 if and only
if the benet of coordination (B) is large enough.
Altogether, we have,
Proposition 3 Fix e = e: Compared to non-integration, integration generates no loss of control,
but induces loss in the agents incentive of making ex ante investment. Integration arises if and
only if the benet of coordination (B) is large enough.
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5 Empirical Evidences
Compared to the literature on the theory of the rm, which focuses on incentives, this paper
underlines control and makes two points. One, integration is driven by the benet of coordina-
tion. The other, centralized ownership of physical capital (namely integration) helps implement
coordination, because it enhances control over key human capitals. This section present two
evidences for these points.
5.1 GM-Fisher Re-examined
The event that General Motors acquired all Fisher Bodys interest in 1926 was extensively cited
in the literature on theory of the rm since Klein et al (1978). This classic story is re-examined
by Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber (2000), Coase (2000), and Freeland, all published in Journal
of Law and Economics. They make three points.
First, their common point is that hold-up problem and the relationship-specic physical
investment were not problems at all when GM acquired Fisher Body, and there existed no other
important incentive problems either.
Second, the integration was driven by the benet of coordination, as Casadesus-Masanel
and Spulber (2000) note that vertical integration was directed at improving coordination of
production and inventories, assuring GM of adequate supplies of auto bodies, and providing
GM with access to the executive talents of the Fisher brothers (page 67). Let us elaborate
further. The integration happened in 1926, though GM had acquired part of Fishers interest
before, exactly because about then closed bodies were coming to have strategic importance.8
That is, the benets of coordination became high. From 1924, the automobile market began to
transform, the design and the styling of closed bodies became the primary method of achieving
product di¤erentiation and dening a new line of cars(Freeland (2000), page52). Responding
to that transformation, GM took the policy of introducing annual model changes. . . , which
"would require ongoing consultation and coordination between Fish and the car divisions(both
8Freeland (2000) notes, (A) second factor contributing to vertical integration was Fishers increasing strategic
importance(page 52).
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from Freeland (2000), page 50).
Third, in order to implement the coordination, it is critical to retain and control Firsher
brothershuman capital. Freeland (2000) notes that the primary factors leading to vertical
integration were GMmanagements fears over the Fisher brothersimpending departure, coupled
with problems of nancing new body plants(page 33) and that "GMs management believed
that Fishers physical assets would remain relatively useless without the continued involvement
of the Fishers (page 53). And Casadesus-Masanel and Spulber (2000) note that vertical
integration was directed at ... providing GM with access to the executive talents of the Fisher
brothers(page 67).
Therefore, GM-Fisher story well supports this paperspoints.
5.2 Retail Contracting
Manufacturers sell their product to consumers through the retail outlets owned by themselves
(vertical integration) or through independent retailers (non-integration). On this choice, exten-
sive empirical work has been done, of which Lafontaine and Slade (1997) provide a good survey.
They point out that retail contracting generally involves no important relationship-specic assets
or investment. Besides, Lafontaine and Shaw (2001) show that after eight or more years of devel-
opment franchisors generally maintain a stable rate of company-owned outlets to the franchised
ones. They nd that the stable rates vary considerably across sectors, and that brand-name
value is a primary determinant, with franchisors of high values brandnames targeting high rates
of company ownership. They argue that that is because those franchisors need to exert more
direct managerial control over outlets to avoid or to reduce the free riding of franchisees on the
brandnames. This is consistent with the point of this paper that it is driven by the benet of
coordination. Moreover, in some cases, the e¤ects on brandnames are positively measured by
outlet size or previous experience required. They point out that the e¤ects of these two
variables on company ownership rate is inconsistent with agency theories, which instead predict
that the larger the size or the higher the experience, the bigger the monitoring costs and hence
the less the company ownership.
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6 Conclusion
The paper studies how the principal can enhance her control over the agents human capital by
acquiring the critical capital for him to create value and how the enhancement in control entails
loss in the agents incentive of making investment ex ante and exerting e¤ort ex post.
Control aims to implement win-lose coordination, namely to have the agent do the specic
project that ts the principals particular need but does not benet the agent immediately.
In this paper, only the agent knows how to operate with the capital, the ownership of which,
therefore, does not spontaneously convey decision rights on the project choice; indeed, the project
choice is always decided by the bargaining between the principal and the agent. However, the
specic project is more likely to be chosen when the principal owns the capital than when the
agents owns it. This is because the default choice is the specic project in the former case and
the general project in the latter, and the default project is prone to be chosen: since there is
friction of bargaining, in the form of information asymmetry in this paper, the default project
is negotiated away only if the e¢ ciency gain is great enough.
Control entails incentive loss, because the win-lose nature of the coordination necessarily
draws A into a hold-up situation. Indeed, if doing the specic project, A only reaps half of its
value, since P is the only buyer of his product, while he reaps the full value if doing the general
project. The specic project is thus associated with incentive loss, in relation to both ex ante
human capital investment and ex post e¤ort.
Therefore, the trade-o¤ between control and incentive decides the boundary of the rm. The
paper shows that the integration (principal-ownership) induces too much coordination and non-
integration (agent-ownership) induces too little, and that integration happens if and only if the
benet of coordination is large enough.
Appendix: the proof of Proposition 2
To prove the proposition, two lemmas concerning concave functions are applied often and are
given below.
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Lemma A1: If f()  0 is concave and f(0) = 0; f(y)
f(x)
 y
x
for 0 < y < x:
Proof: f(y) = f( y
x
x+ x y
x
0)  y
x
f(x) + x y
x
f(0): QED
Lemma A2: if f() is concave, then R b
a
f(t)dt  f( b+a
2
)(b  a):
Proof: for any x 2 [0; b a
2
]; f( b+a
2
)  f( b+a
2
  x)  f 0( b+a
2
)x  f( b+a
2
+ x)  f( b+a
2
): QED
To simplify notations, let et = e(t); dt = d(e(t)) and D(t) = maxe td(e)  ce(e): Then V (t) =
D(t) + tB; e0 = d0 = 0; vs(et) = dt +B; and in particular, bv = vs(e0:5) = d0:5 +B:
By gure 4, the di¤erence between the two regimes is that for 0:5 < t < bT ; the specic
project is chosen under regime 2 with a probability 0.5 higher than that under regime 1. The
social surplus of the specic project is V (0:5) + 0:5bv and that of the general project is V (t):
Therefore, the di¤erence in the ex ante social surplus between the two regimes, W 1   W 2;
satises 2(W 1  W 2)(B) = R bT
0:5
V (t)   (V (0:5) + 0:5bv)dt: Note that V (t)   (V (0:5) + 0:5bv) =
D(t) D(0:5)  d0:5 + (t  1)B and hence its derivative to B equals t  1: Therefore,
(A3): 2d(W
1 W 2)(B)
dB
=
R bT
0:5
(t  1)dt+ (V (bT )  V (0:5)  0:5bv) dbT
dB
:R bT
0:5
(t 1)dtmeasures the coordination loss and is thus negative; and it is easy to be calculated.
However, V (bT )   V (0:5)   0:5bv = V (bT )   V (bt) > 0; as V (bt) = V (0:5) + 0:5bv by (1). To prove
the proposition, we estimate dbT
dB
and V (bT )  V (0:5)  0:5bv:
Lemma A4: dbT
dB
= 2(1 
bT )
2d bT+2B (1 bT )d0(e bT )e0bT :
Proof: By lemma 3, bT is dened by V (bT ) = bF + V (1
2
) where bF > 0:5bv is the solution
of Ps problem: maxF Pr(etjV (et)   F )  V (0:5))(F   0:5bv): By variable transformation V (t) =
F +V (0:5); the problem becomes maxt(1  t)(V (t) V (0:5)  0:5bv) and bT is its solution. Given
that V 0(t) = vs(et) = dt +B; it satises the rst order condition:  V (bT ) + V (0:5) + 0:5bv+ (1 bT )(dbT +B) = 0,  D(bT ) +D(0:5) + 0:5d0:5 + (1  bT )(dbT + 2B) = 0: The lemma follows from
the implicit function theorem and D0 = dt. QED
Lemma A5: when c000e (:)  0 and d000(:)  0; et is concave.
Proof: et is decided by the rst order condition td0(e) = c0e(e): Then e
00(t) = d
00(c00 td00) d0(c000 d00 td000)
(c00 td00)2 <
0; given the conditions in the lemma and d0(e) > 0; c00(e) > 0; d00(e) < 0. QED
Then dt is also concave, since it is the compound of a concave function (d(e)) with another
concave function (e(t)).
22
Lemma A6: dbT
dB
< 2(1 
bT )
d bT :
Proof: As dt is also concave and d0 = 0; dt  d0(et)e0tt: Obviously bT > 0:5: Therefore
dbT  d0(ebT )e0bT bT > d0(ebT )e0bT (1   bT ): Then 2dbT + 2B   (1   bT )d0(ebT )e0bT > dbT : This lemma then
follows Lemma A4. QED
Lemma A7: bT  p3
2
:
Proof: By (2), V (bT )  V (0:5) = bF > 0:5bv = 0:5vs(e0:5); which, together with V 0(t) = vs(et),
implies that
R bT
0:5
vs(et) > 0:5vs(e0:5)jby lemma A2 ) vs(e( bT+0:52 ))(bT   0:5) > 0:5vs(e0:5) , 2(bT  
0:5) > vs(e0:5)
vs(e(
bT+0:5
2
))
jby lemma A1 > 0:5bT+0:5
2
; where the last inequality applies the fact that vs(e(t)) is
concave. Hence, bT 2   0:25 > 0:5: QED
We have done enough as to estimating dbT
dB
and move on to estimate V (bT )  V (0:5)  0:5bv:
Lemma A8: V (bT )  V (0:5)  0:5bv < bTdbT   d0:5:
Proof: V (bT )  (V (0:5)+0:5bv) = bTvs(ebT )  ce(ebT )  vs(e0:5)+ ce(e0:5)) < bTvs(ebT )  vs(e0:5) =bTdbT   d0:5   (1  bT )B < bTdbT   d0:5: QED
Finally estimate the right hand side of (A3). By Lemmas A6 and A8, 2d(W
1 W 2)(B)
dB
<
 (bT   0:5)(1  bT+0:5
2
) + (bTdbT   d0:5)2(1 bT )d bT   (bT   0:5)(1  bT+0:52 ) + 2(1  bT )(bT   0:5bT ); where
the last inequality applies  d0:5
d bT 
 0:5bT ; derived from A1. To show that d(W 1 W 2)(B)dB is upper
bounded by a strictly negative constant, it su¢ ces to show that min
1bTp3
2
(bT  0:5)(1  bT+0:5
2
) 
2(1  bT )(bT   0:5bT ) > 0; where bT  p32 is from lemma A7. Rearrange the terms, the function to be
minimized equals 1
4bT g(bT ); where g(t) = 6t3  4t2  5:5t+4: In order to show min1tp32 g(t)4t > 0;
it su¢ ces to show min
1t
p
3
2
g(t) > 0:
It is easy to check that within [0:5; 1]; g0(t) = 0 has unique solution t = 4+
p
115
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<
p
3
2
: It
follows that g0(t) have the sign for 1  t 
p
3
2
: Note that g0(1) > 0: Therefore, g0(t) > 0 for
t 2 [
p
3
2
; 1] and min
1t
p
3
2
g(t) = g(
p
3
2
) = 2 
p
3
2
> 0: Q.E.D.
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